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Abstract
This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank repo
auctions. It is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the
primitives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading
components) are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we
calibrate a theoretical model in order to illustrate some comparative static
results. This exercise sheds light on the debate about the reversed winner￿ s
curse found in the empirical literature on ECB auctions by showing that
it may be related to an identi￿cation problem. Overall the results suggest
that strategic and optimal behavior is prevalent in ECB tenders. We ￿nd
evidence of a statistically signi￿cant bid-shading component, even though
the number of bidders is very large. Bid-shading increases with liquidity
uncertainty and decreases with the number of participants and with price
uncertainty. We argue that a su¢ cient condition for the latter e⁄ect to
appear in the data is that the residual supply facing an individual bidder
does not change much ex-post when very short-term market rates increase.
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21. Introduction
The banking system in the euro area1 is in a structural de￿cit position vis-￿-vis
the Eurosystem.2 In fact, according to the consolidated ￿nancial statement of
the Eurosystem3 on 1 July 2005, on the asset side, the re￿nancing of the ECB
provided to the banking system via open market operations and recourse to the
marginal lending facility amounted to EUR 398 billion, of which EUR 308 billion
corresponded to liquidity provided through the regular (weekly) main re￿nancing
operations. The latter are executed in the form of tender procedures.4
Central bank operations and government auctions of treasury securities look
like similar means of allocating a good. In particular, both take place in the
environment of a secondary market which in principle allows potential buyers to
arbitrage away any potential di⁄erence in prices between the primary and the
secondary markets. However, the central bank auctions like those conducted by
the ECB di⁄er from Treasury auctions in several important dimensions. Firstly,
central bank re￿nancing is provided against collateral. To the extent that low
opportunity cost collateral is used ￿rst, the marginal valuation of liquidity should
be declining as collateral of better quality must be increasingly provided. Second,
in the euro area banks have to ful￿ll reserve requirements and this, rather then
reselling in the secondary market, is the main motive for banks to bid in the
regular open market operations of the ECB. Third, unlike T-bills, there are only
imperfect substitutes to ECB re￿nancing. For example banks face credit limits
and may not be able to borrow the full extent of their liquidity needs, or they may
not be willing to extend their own credit limits. Thus, borrowing in the primary
market with the objective of reselling in the secondary market is not as prevalent
as in the Treasury bond market. Fourth, there is little uncertainty about the
1The euro area refers to the 12 European Union (EU) Member States that share a single
currency - the euro. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Nederlands, Portugal and Spain.
2The Eurosystem refers to the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 12 National Central
Banks (NCBs) of the participating EU Member States.
3The consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem shows that, on the liabilities side, the
main liquidity absorbing factor is banknotes in circulation followed by current account holdings
of credit institutions with the Eurosystem, where the latter cater essentially for the minimum
reserve system. The consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem is published regularly in the
Euro Area Statistics Annex of the ECB Monthly Bulletin.
4For details on the operational framework of the Eurosystem see ￿ The implementation
of monetary policy in the euro area: general documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy
instruments and procedures￿ , ECB, February 2005, downloadable from www.ecb.int.
3(common) value of the good auctioned.5 In fact, re￿nancing is provided for very
short-term (overnight in the case of the marginal lending facility or one-week in
the case of the main re￿nancing operations of the ECB) for which there is little
price risk and, besides, a very liquid derivatives (swap) market exists, revealing
the common value of the good.6 Moreover, the announcement of the outcome
of the main re￿nancing operations of the ECB has, in general, no additional
informational content for market participants.7 This means that banks do not
change the private value attached to the good they receive after knowing the
tender results.
The combined features of declining marginal valuations, low uncertainty about
the market value of the good and reserve requirements should be taken into ac-
count when modelling ECB tenders. In this paper we empirically test a model of
optimal bidding in variable rate tenders using data from ECB auctions. Existing
empirical work on the ECB main re￿nancing operations has relied exclusively on
panel data analysis without any underlying structural model (see Nyborg et al.,
2002 and Scalia et al., 2005). Both papers conclude that bid shading by partic-
ipants to ECB tenders decreases with interest rate uncertainty, which is against
the prediction of standard single-unit, common value auction theory (winner￿ s
curse). This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank auctions
in so far as it is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the primi-
tives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading components)
are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we calibrate a theoretical
multi-unit private values auction model, in order to illustrate some comparative
static results. This exercise allows us to shed some light on the debate about
5Except on the ￿nal day of the reserve maintenance period. In the euro area the reserve
maintenance period has a variable length, of approximately one month.
6The announcement of the weekly auction takes place, as a rule, on Monday at 15:00, to-
gether with the publication of the Eurosystem￿ s forecast of the average daily liquidity needs
of the banking system until the next open market operation, stemming from the so-called au-
tonomous factors. At the same time, the ECB also publishes the benchmark allotment which
corresponds, in general, to the amount of reserves that, based on past ful￿lment and the pro-
jected autonomous factors, would bring the average reserve holdings one week ahead in line with
the reserve requirement plus a technical, small amount for excess reserves.
7Bids may be submitted until 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday. The result of the auction is published
by the ECB on the wire services Reuters and Bloomberg at 11:20 a.m. on the auction day. The
announcement gives the total allotment amount, total bid amount, number of bidders, minimum
and maximum bid rates, weighted average allotment rate, marginal rate and percentage of
allotment at the marginal rate. Within a short time-window after the publication of the results
one does not observe, in general, any movement in very-short term money market interest rates.
4the reversed winner￿ s curse found in the empirical literature on ECB tenders by
showing that it may be related to an identi￿cation problem. The remainder of the
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical model of optimal
bidding and Section 3 explains the econometric methodology. The data used in
the study is described in Section 4 and the results are presented in Section 5. The
main conclusions are presented at the end.
2. Theoretical framework
As mentioned in Section 1, the Eurosystem conducts weekly tenders whereby re￿-
nancing is provided to the banking system. The liquidity is allotted via standard
tender procedures, ￿ pay-as-you-bid ￿and pro-rata allotment at the cut-o⁄ price
(marginal rate).8 Formally these auctions are multi-unit auctions (or share auc-
tions) with discriminatory pricing and a reserve price. Existing empirical work on
the ECB main re￿nancing operations has relied on panel data analysis where the
main theoretical predictions are derived in analogy to single-unit auctions (see Ny-
borg et al., 2002 and Scalia et al., 2005). Both papers conclude that bid shading
by participants to ECB tenders decreases with interest rate uncertainty, which is
against the prediction of standard single-unit auction theory (with common values
and discriminatory pricing), the winner￿ s curse.
The theory tested in this paper builds on the seminal paper by Wilson (1979)
on auctions of shares. More speci￿cally, the theoretical model is designed to
capture the essential features of central bank auctions like those of the ECB. For
complete references and details on the derivations, as well as for the discussion of
uniform vs. discriminatory pricing, and homogeneous vs. heterogenous bidders,
the reader is referred to Ewerhart et al. (2006). Here, the discussion will focus
exclusively on the discriminatory pricing, homogeneous agents model.
8The Eurosystem has the option of conducting either ￿xed rate (volume) or variable rate
(interest) tenders. The main re￿nancing operations have been conducted as variable rate tenders,
with a minimum bid rate, since June 2001. In the variable rate tenders banks may submit bids
for up to ten di⁄erent pairs of interest rate/quantity levels. The interest rates bid must be
expressed as multiples of 0.01 percentage point. The minimum bid amout is EUR 1,000,000
and bids exceeding this amount must be expressed as multiples of EUR 100,000. Counterparties
are expected to cover the amounts alloted to them (not their bids) by a su¢ cient amout of
eligible underlying assets. For further details on the tender procedures see ￿ The implementation
of monetary policy in the euro area: general documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy
instruments and procedures￿ , ECB, February 2005, downloadable from www.ecb.int.
5Model A central bank puts up for sale a random quantity, the total allotment
e Q ￿ 0, of liquidity (i.e. a perfectly divisible good). There are two alternative
interpretations for uncertainty about aggregate allotment. First, the central bank
may possess a superior knowledge about the aggregate liquidity shortage facing
the banking system. Second, there may be a fraction of non-strategic bidders.
In practice, both e⁄ects contribute to the uncertainty about the residual supply
perceived by the individual bidder (bank). For reasons of tractability we assume




: There are i = 1;2;:::;n bidders which
do not observe the total allotment prior to the submission of bids. The central
bank does not exploit its information about the incoming bid schedules to a⁄ect
the distribution of e Q. Marginal valuations are assumed to be linearly decreasing
from a maximum valuation v > 0 that is common to all bidders. Thus, bidder i￿ s
marginal valuations for quantities qi ￿ 0 are formally given by vi(qi) = v￿B
￿1
i qi,
for an exogenous parameter Bi > 0: We consider a symmetric set-up where B1 =
B2 = ::: = Bn. The tender mechanism asks each bidder to submit a bid schedule
that speci￿es, for any price p ￿ 0, the amount xi(pi) ￿ 0 that bidder i is willing
to buy at p. A schedule xi(pi) is admissible if it is non-increasing, left-continuous,
and if xi(pi) = 0 for a su¢ ciently high p. It is assumed that only admissible
bid schedules are accepted by the auctioneer. Let x(p) =
Pn
i=1 xi(p) denote
total demand at price p, and P ￿(e Q) =
n
p ￿ 0jx(p) ￿ e Q
o
the set of prices at
which total demand can be satis￿ed. The stop-out price is de￿ned as the in￿mum
p￿(e Q) = inf P ￿(e Q) of such prices.
Individual allotments are determined by satisfying all bids strictly above the
stop-out price, and by applying rationing at the margin, if necessary. De￿ne
x
+
i (p￿) = limp!p￿;p>p￿ xi(p) as bidder￿ s i demand at a price just above p￿, and let
x+(p￿) =
Pn








xi(p￿(e Q)) ￿ x
+
i (p￿(e Q))
x(p￿(e Q)) ￿ x+(p￿(e Q))
n





in state e Q. Thus, when demand exceeds supply, the allotment is composed of a
complete allocation of the part of the bid schedule that lies above the stop-out
price, and a pro-rata allocation of any ￿ at segment of the bid schedule that lies
at the stop-out price. The tuple (p￿;q￿
1;q￿
2;:::;q￿
n) consisting of the stop-out price
and the individual allotments will be referred to as the outcome of the tender.
6Bidders are risk-neutral, assumed to maximize expected pro￿ts. De￿ne the
inverse bid schedule as bi(qi) = inf fp ￿ 0jxi(p) ￿ qig. Under discriminatory pric-
ing, the bidder i pays his own bid bi(qi) for any marginal unit, so that the resulting








fvi(qi) ￿ bi(qi)gdqi: (2.2)
Equilibrium An equilibrium can be found for n ￿ 2, when bidders i =
1;2;:::;n; have identical marginal valuations vi(qi) = v￿B￿1qi. Assume also that








for p > vd
for pmin < p ￿ vd





for i = 1;2;:::;n; where
v













are the maximum price bid, the slope of the inverse bid schedule, and the minimum
stop-out price, respectively.
The equilibrium marginal rate in the model is stochastic as it depends on the
allotment. The expected marginal rate is equal to the rate that obtains when the
central bank allots half of the maximum quantity and it is given by
E(p




and when n ! 1 the quantity allotted is Q(n) = n Q. Then, the maximum price








7and the expected marginal rate will converge to
lim
n!1E(p




Then strategic behavior does not disappear in the limit.9
Illustration of the model The solution of the model is illustrated in Figure
1. The true linear demand curve (dotted line) is represented above a piecewise
linear bid schedule (xi(p)) which was drawn for Q(n) = 300 (EUR billion). The
other parameters are set as follows: v = 2:06 (the one-week EONIA swap rate
level10); B = 20; n = 300, i.e. calibrated to match euro area data (see Section 3
for details). Auction prices correspond to interest rates in percent. Full allotment
is at Q(n)=n = 1; to which it corresponds a stop-out price at 2:01.
Equilibrium is determined at the interception of the individual bid schedule
with the residual supply curve, i.e. the supply diminished by the allotments made
to the other bidders at a given price. An equilibrium is depicted such that the
allotment ratio is 50%; the stop-out price (marginal tender rate) is at 2:0225, and
the corresponding repo rate (equal to the true marginal valuation) is at 2:035
with a bid-shading component of 1:25 basis points. Suppose the central bank set
a minimum bid rate at 2:0. Thus, in this particular case, the spread between the
swap rate and the minimum bid rate would be 6 basis points; the spread between
the repo rate11 and the minimum bid rate would be 3:5 basis points, and the
spread between the marginal tender rate and the minimum bid rate would be 2:25
basis points. These values are close to those often observed in the euro money
market with an ECB￿ s minimum bid rate at 2.0.
Consider next an allotment with Q(n) = 400 with the remaining parameters
unchanged. This is equivalent to an increase in liquidity uncertainty (see Figure
2). In this case full allotment is at Q(n)=n = 1:33 and stop-out price just below
9See Ewerhart et al. (2006) for formal proofs and further discussion.
10EONIA (euro overnight index rate) is a weighted average of the interest rates on unsecured
overnight lending transactions denominated in euro, as reported by a panel of contributing
banks. The one-week EONIA swap rate is the main reference for banks when they prepare their
bids, given that this segment of the swap market is very liquid and the Eurosystem￿ s re￿nancing
operations have one-week maturity. Given that the underlying EONIA refers to unsecured loans,
bids submitted to ECB repo operations should be below that rate.
11The theoretical repo rate does not correspond to the private market repo rate (the so-called
GC rate). The former should lie somewhat above the latter because it is collateralized with less
liquid paper.
82:0; which is not feasible if the central bank￿ s minimum bid rate is at 2:0. The
expected equilibrium is depicted such that an allotment ratio of 50% prevails. The
(expected) stop-out price is at 2:015; while the repo rate remains at 2:035 with a
bid-shading component of 2 basis points. Thus, in this particular case, the spread
between the swap rate and the minimum bid rate would be 6 basis points; the
spread between the repo rate and the minimum bid rate, 3:5 basis points, and
the spread between the marginal tender rate and the minimum bid rate would be
1:5 basis points. This exercise illustrates why using a measure of market price
volatility (zero in this case) would not allow estimating the impact of liquidity
uncertainty on bid shading (increase in bid shading). This is an example of an
identi￿cation problem that might have a⁄ected the empirical literature.
Finally consider again an allotment with Q(n) = 300; however with a higher
swap rate (v = 2:08): An ex-post equilibrium is depicted (which is not equal to
the expected one) such that an allotment ratio of 60% prevails, which would be
obtained with an unchanged residual supply (Figure 3). In this case volatility in
market interest rates would be associated with a decline in bid shading (which
would be wrongly interpreted as a reversal of the winner￿ s curse). As this example
shows, the residual supply facing an individual bidder not changing much when
very short-term market rates increase is a su¢ cient condition for bid-shading to
decrease with price uncertainty.12
Empirical predictions The theoretical model suggests ￿ve testable predic-
tions about individual bidding behavior and interest rate spreads:
1. The strategic inverse bid schedule is ￿ atter than the true demand. The bid
schedule is steeper than the true marginal valuation curve.
2. Bid-shading decreases with the number of bidders; however, it does not
disappear even when n becomes very large.
3. Bid shading increases with supply uncertainty.
4. The impact of price uncertainty on bid shading is ambiguous.
5. In equilibrium there is a positive spread between the repo rate and the
marginal (stop-out) price.
12This is a su¢ cient condition if an increase in the level of the overnight interest rate is
associated with an increase in its volatility, which is expected via a risk premium e⁄ect.
93. Econometric methodology
3.1. Estimation of a structural model
The linear model of the auction with discriminatory pricing, which has been solved
explicitly by Ewerhart et al. (2006), can be tested following a general econometric
approach as suggested by Horta￿su (2002a). We apply the structural empirical
approach to auctions, which is an expanding ￿eld recently surveyed by Athey and
Haile (2004). We proceed in three steps:
1. Estimation of the equilibrium price for each auction.
2. Estimation of the bid-shading components.
3. Tests on individual bidding behavior.
Denote bidder i￿ s marginal utility from winning q units of the good, vi(q). The











where qi = xi(p); and H (pc;xi (p)) and dH (pc;xi (p)) are the cumulative dis-
tribution and density functions of the market clearing price (pc), conditional on




xj (pc) and H (pc;xi (p)) = Prfpc ￿ ptjxi (p)g:
The Euler necessary condition for the maximization of the objective function
is then






@pc ; v (xi (p)) is the true marginal valuation given
to quantity q by bidder i. It is equal to the price bid p plus the bid-shading
component, measured by the inverse hazard ratio. The above optimality condition
allows to nonparametrically identify the marginal valuations of the bidders using
observed bids.
103.2. Estimation of the auction￿ s equilibrium price
Since in the case of ECB tenders most banks submit just one bid at each auction,
only average individual bidding functions have been estimated. Estimation has
been performed by considering jointly the data for all the auctions for each bank,
aggregating the bids over all the auctions, and averaging the bids to obtain the
￿nal data. This has required the exclusion from the sample of all banks that bid
at the same price in all auctions. The aggregate approach followed is justi￿ed by
the stable environment, in terms of smooth liquidity supply and bidding behavior,
that characterized the euro area money market over the period investigated.
The OLS estimator has been employed, considering both linear and log-log
speci￿cations. The equilibrium price for each auction has been computed by
equating the aggregate bidding function, obtained by horizontal summing of the
inverse individual bidding functions, and total supply, and solving for the equi-
librium price (interest rate). Hence, by denoting the estimated inverse aggregate
bid function as p = ^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿Qd, the equilibrium price has been computed from the
market equilibrium condition, Qd = Qs as pc = ^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿Qs.
3.3. Nonparametric estimation of the bid-shading components
There are T auctions in the sample and Nt bidders participate at auction t, t =
1;:::;T: The procedure to estimate the bid-shading components works as follows:
i) select auction t and bidder i;
ii) from the sample of Nt￿1 vectors draw a random sample of Nt￿1 individual
intercept and slope vectors with replacement;
iii) use the random sample to compute the residual supply function and in-
tersect with bidder i0s bidding function to determine the market clearing price
(pc);
iv) repeat for B times the previous steps to determine the empirical cumula-
tive conditional distribution of the market clearing price ^ H(pc;xi(p)), taking into
account the truncation implied by the minimum bid rate;
v) then, with reference to the estimated equilibrium price for the auction pc;t;
compute the probability Prfpc ￿ pc;tjxi (p)g = ^ H(pc;t;xi(p)) and the value of the




^ H(pc;t;xi(p)) ￿ ^ H(p0;xi(p))
pc;t ￿ p0 , where
p0 is the ordered price statistic before the equilibrium price (::: < p0 < pc;t < :::).
The bid-shading component can then be computed;
vi) repeat the previous steps for each of the bidders participating to auction t.
11vii) repeat the previous steps for each auction.
Kernel estimation has been employed at point v). Given that the price distri-
bution is truncated to the left, i.e. the bid rate cannot fall below the minimum
bid rate, a Gaussian truncated kernel has been employed for the estimation of the
equilibrium price density function.13 Finally, standard errors for the bid-shading
components have been obtained by bootstrapping the empirical distribution of
the bid-shading components for each auction.14
3.4. Tests of individual bidding behavior
On the basis of the estimated slopes and intercepts, heterogeneity across bidders
can be assessed and measured by standard statistical tools. Moreover, tests on
bidding behavior can be carried out as follows.
3.4.1. Test 1: Is more successful bidding associated with more aggres-
sive bidding?
The ￿rst test of bidding behavior is a general one, not directly related to the
theoretical model but nonetheless interesting on its own. The following cross
sectional regressions were performed
￿ si = ￿￿0 + ￿￿1^ ￿i + "￿i; (3.3)
￿ si = ￿￿0 + ￿￿1j^ ￿ij + "￿i;
where ￿ si is the average shortfall over the auctions in which bidder i has partici-
pated, and ^ ￿i and j^ ￿ij are the estimated intercept and (absolute) slope parameters
of the individual (inverse) bidding functions. The shortfall in a given auction has
been measured as the ratio of the quantity demanded by the bidder and the quan-
tity actually allocated to the bidder. Thus, an increase in this measure means
less success at the auction. It is expected that ￿￿1 < 0 and ￿￿1 < 0, denoting
that an increase in shortfall is associated with less aggressive behavior measured
by lower ^ ￿i and lower j^ ￿ij. This test can be interpreted as a test on whether
bidding strategically pays-o⁄. This is important given the potential existence of
non-strategic bidders when their number is very large.
13See Pagan and Ullah (1999).
14For a similar approach see Horta￿su (2002b).
123.4.2. Test 2: Is the strategic inverse bid schedule ￿ atter than the true
demand?
The test can be implemented by running the cross sectional regression
j^ ￿ij = ￿q0 + ￿q￿ qi + "￿i; (3.4)
where ￿ qi is the average quantity bid by bidder i over all the auctions in which it
has participated. It is expected ￿q < 0; which can be interpreted as bid-shading
decreasing in the quantity bid. This is consistent with the idea of a true valuation
schedule steeper than the observed bid schedule.
3.4.3. Test 3: The sources of bid-shading
To assess whether a relationship between the amount of bid-shading and the un-
certainty in the value of the good auctioned, supply uncertainty, and the number
of bidders can be found, the following cross sectional regression has been estimated
bsi = ￿01 + ￿11^ ￿i + ￿21^ ￿zi + ￿31Ni + "bsi;
where bsi is the average of the estimated bid shading components, considering
all the bidders participating at auction i; obtained using the above described
approaches, ^ ￿i is price value uncertainty, measured by the conditional standard
deviation of the one-week Eonia swap rate for the week preceding auction i15 or
by the price intercept dispersion; Ni is the number of participants to auction i;
and ^ ￿zi is a proxy for liquidity supply uncertainty for auction i, measured by the
conditional standard deviation of the cumulated liquidity forecast error for auction
i.16 It is expected that ￿21 > 0 and ￿31 < 0. The sign of the parameter ￿11 is
open to di⁄erent interpretations and predictions about its sign. We interpret it
as capturing the price level e⁄ect of an increase in the volatility of the one-week
EONIA swap rate. In fact, if an increase in price uncertainty is associated with
an increase in the spread between the one-week EONIA swap rate and the ECB
minimum bid rate (e.g. a risk premium e⁄ect), this is equivalent to an increase
15The daily volatility of the one-week Eonia swap rate has been computed by means of a
GARCH(1,1) model. The weekly volatility has been computed by summing the daily volatility
over the ￿ve working days of the week.
16It refers to the conditional standard deviation of the cumulated liquidity forecast error made
by the Eurosystem, over eigth days, on the allotment day, computed by means of a GARCH
(1,1) model.
13in the parameter v of the theoretical model. Then, a su¢ cient condition for bid-
shading to decline when the interest rate (and its volatility) increases is that the
residual supply facing bidder i should not change in equilibrium.
4. The data
The data set includes all bids submitted to the 31 weekly main re￿nancing op-
erations conducted by the ECB between 16 March 2004 and 11 October 2004.
During the period under analysis the maturity of the ECB repo operations was
one week. The average number of bidders was 359 with an average of 515 bids,
thus giving 1.44 bids per bidder. This illustrates the fact that most bidders bid for
all the quantity at a single price. The average bid amount was EUR 300 billion,
with a maximum of EUR 344 billion and a minimum of EUR 224 billion. Thus,
in the calibration exercise presented in Section 2, we set as benchmark values
Q(n) = 300 and n = 300. The average allotted amount was EUR 239 billion, with
a maximum of EUR 263 billion and a minimum of EUR 206 billion, suggesting
a relatively stable supply environment. The bid-to-cover ratio moved around an
average value of 1.26, which suggests relatively successful bidding. In the sample
period the marginal MRO rate was 2.007 on average, the average repo rate 2.011,
the weighted average MRO rate was 2.0148 on average, and the average EONIA
swap rate 2.0306. Thus, the spread between the repo and the marginal rate was
0.4 basis points, indicative of a positive bid shading component.17 In the calibra-
tion exercise we used somewhat higher market rates for the sake of clarity in the
illustration.
5. Empirical results
Not all the data are usable for the empirical analysis. In fact, the implementation
of the (averaged) parametric disaggregated approach requires the availability of at
least two di⁄erent bids placed during the 31 auctions in the sample, not necessarily
at the same auction. After excluding from the sample the banks that placed only a
single bid over the 31 auctions or always bid at the same price, 525 banks and 15753
bids (representing a value of EUR 9297.607 billion) are left, against a total of 593
17Note that the theoretical repo rate should lie somewhat above the private (GC) repo rate
because on average the collateral used in the latter is more liquid than the collateral used in the
ECB main re￿nancing operations.
14banks and 15973 bids (for a total value of EUR 9327.326 billion). Although the
number of excluded banks relative to the total number of banks in the sample is not
negligible (12%; 68 banks), the number of excluded bids is negligible both in terms
of total number (0.25%; 220 bids) and total value (0.3%; EUR 29.719 billion).
Hence, the analysis carried out by means of the disaggregated parametric approach
should not be a⁄ected by sample trimming, albeit subject to the caveat that the
estimated bidding functions are only representative of the average behavior of
each agent. Yet, in the light of the short sample employed (March 2004 - October
2004) and the relatively smooth liquidity supply and bidding environment that
characterized the euro area money market over the period investigated, the results
drawn from the average analysis are expected to be reliable. Moreover, the period
under analysis was marked by absence of short-term expectations of key ECB
interest rate changes, which could have undermined the private values assumption
underlying the modelling approach.
5.1. Bidders￿heterogeneity
A ￿rst evaluation of the presence of heterogeneity across bidders can be carried
out through the analysis of the estimated bidding functions for each single bidder.
As discussed in the methodological section, bidding functions for each agent and
auction have been estimated by means of OLS regressions using both a linear and
log-log speci￿cation. Given the characteristics of the data analyzed, only average
bidding functions could be estimated for each agent. Summary statistics are
reported in Table 1, where ￿gures have been normalized relative to the average
allotment value, while in Figure 4 the estimated empirical distributions, after
log transformation, are plotted. Only results obtained for the linear model have
been reported, since the latter speci￿cation appeared to be superior to the log-log
model in terms of ￿t (the average R2 is equal to 0.98 for the linear model and
0.95 for the log-log model). As Table 1 and Figure 4 show, there is evidence
of heterogeneity across bidders, with 70% of the slopes and intercepts falling in
the range (-0.002, -0.16) and (0.008, 0.85), respectively (the estimated standard
deviations are equal to 0.93 and 1.89, with mean values equal to -0.20 and 0.41,
for slopes and intercepts respectively).
Evidence of heterogeneity is also provided by the estimated price (interest
rate) elasticities, ranging between -203 and -33 (estimated mean and standard
deviations are -94 and 34). Despite the variability found, in all cases the evidence
points to highly elastic (inverse) bidding functions. Computing the price elastic-
15ities using the log-log model, rather than using the average bids values, does not
modify this conclusion, with quantiles also numerically very similar to the ones
obtained from the linear model.
As shown by the QQ-plots reported in Figure 4, the distribution of the es-
timated slopes and intercepts is very close to a lognormal one, while for the
elasticities the evidence is less compelling, due to a heavier than predicted left
tail. An important open question thus is whether the presence of heterogeneity is
su¢ cient to empirically reject the theoretical results implied by an homogeneous
agents framework.
5.2. Bid-shading analysis
In Figure 4 the empirical distribution for the estimated (log) bid-shading com-
ponents are plotted as well, while in Table 1 quantiles for the actual values of
the components (multiplied by 100) and the test for signi￿cance of the estimated
components are reported. Three ￿ndings seem to be of particular interest. First,
the bidshading components seem to follow closely a log normal distribution. Sec-
ond, the estimated bid-shading components tend to be small, ranging between 0.2
b.p. and 0.8 b.p., with average value of 0.5 b.p. and a standard deviation equal
to 0.12 b.p. Third, the estimated bid-shading components tend to be statistically
signi￿cant. The null of zero bid-shading component, against the alternative of
positive bid-shading component, can in fact be rejected at the 1% signi￿cance
level 90% of the times. Given the large number of bidders participating at each
auction and across auctions, ￿nding positive, statistically signi￿cant bid-shading
components provides evidence that bid-shading does not disappear even when n
becomes very large. This is one of the key theoretical predictions, which is not
rejected.
5.3. Tests on individual bidding behavior
Table 2 reports the results of the tests on bidding behavior described in the
methodological section. The regressions have been estimated by OLS and het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard errors have been computed. Moreover, in or-
der to control for the di⁄erent magnitude of the variables employed the dependent
and independent variables have been standardized.
Test 1: Is more successful bidding associated with more aggressive
bidding? The key parameters to answer this question are ￿￿1 and ￿￿1, which are
16expected to be both negative as an increase in ￿ si (less success) should be correlated
with less aggressive bidding behavior. Indeed, both estimated parameters are
negative and statistically signi￿cant (see Table 2). However, the R2 of the slope
regression is virtually zero (0.01), while that of the intercept regression is non
negligibly larger (0.12).
Test 2: Is the strategic inverse bid schedule ￿ atter than the true de-
mand? The key parameter for this test is ￿q; which is expected to be negative
in the case large bid volumes are accompanied by less bid-shading. This hypoth-
esis is weakly supported by the data (see Table 2). In fact, the linkage between
slopes and the bid quantities is negative, but signi￿cant only at the 10% level.
However, the R2 of the regression is virtually zero (0.01), suggesting that bidders￿
heterogeneity is little explained by this size variable.
Test 3: Sources of bid shading The key parameters for this test are ￿11;
￿21; ￿31: Theoretical results suggest that ￿21 > 0; and ￿31 < 0; No clear cut
prediction can be made about ￿11. Empirical evidence (see Table 2) suggests that
bid-shading tends to fall as value uncertainty and the number of bidders increase
(^ ￿11, ^ ￿13 < 0) and to increase as supply uncertainty increases (^ ￿32 > 0). The
linkage of bid-shading with value uncertainty is signi￿cant only when the one-
week Eonia rate volatility is employed as a measure of value uncertainty. As a
general result, using the standard deviation of the estimated intercepts to proxy
value uncertainty leads to less signi￿cant estimates, both in terms of estimated
coe¢ cients and R2 of the regressions, than when the volatility of the one-week
Eonia rate is employed.18
Overall, the evidence is in line with the theoretical predictions. The ￿nding
that the parameter ￿11 has a negative sign is interesting. Assuming that it is
capturing the risk premium e⁄ect of an increase in the volatility of the one-week
EONIA swap rate, a su¢ cient condition for a decrease in bid shading is that the
residual supply facing individual bidder should not have changed much. The fact
that the bid-to-cover ratio in the sample has increased somewhat when market
and tender rates increased suggests that this might have been the case (see Figure
3).
18The highest, average and lowest R2 for the parametric disaggregated approach are 0.73, 0.66
and 0.58, respectively.
176. Conclusions
Overall the results suggest that strategic and optimal behavior is prevalent in
ECB tenders. Despite the documented heterogeneity across bidders, bidding be-
havior in ECB tenders seems consistent with optimal behavior in a multi-object
discriminatory pricing auction. There is evidence of a statistically signi￿cant bid
shading component, even though the number of bidders is very large. We argue
that the economic analysis of the winner￿ s curse in the context of the open market
operations performed by the Eurosystem may have been impaired by an identi-
￿cation problem. Bid-shading increases with liquidity uncertainty and decreases
with the number of participants and with price uncertainty. The latter suggests
that when the EONIA swap rate increases the residual supply facing individual
bidders does not change much.
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0:01 ￿2:6004 0:0007 ￿203:12 ￿240:28 0:2161 0:0000
0:05 ￿0:9268 0:0016 ￿154:64 ￿178:69 0:2806 3E ￿ 6
0:10 ￿0:4288 0:0033 ￿135:00 ￿162:78 0:3186 1E ￿ 5
0:20 ￿0:1649 0:0075 ￿118:74 ￿138:98 0:3683 4E ￿ 5
0:30 ￿0:0659 0:0136 ￿106:39 ￿122:35 0:4017 8E ￿ 5
0:40 ￿0:0361 0:0232 ￿98:64 ￿112:58 0:4312 0:0002
0:50 ￿0:0207 0:0408 ￿89:46 ￿102:88 0:4586 0:0003
0:60 ￿0:0114 0:0729 ￿80:40 ￿92:36 0:4878 0:0005
0:70 ￿0:0067 0:1303 ￿73:98 ￿84:95 0:5202 0:0010
0:80 ￿0:0037 0:3322 ￿67:06 ￿75:97 0:5571 0:0019
0:90 ￿0:0016 0:8484 ￿58:83 ￿67:13 0:6144 0:0048
0:95 ￿0:0008 1:6879 ￿51:46 ￿58:35 0:6634 0:0102
0:99 ￿0:0004 4:6742 ￿33:18 ￿39:07 0:7914 0:0329
mean ￿0:1996 0:4067 ￿94:12 ￿108:53 0:4653 0:0022
std:dev: 0:9288 1:8951 33:68 39:62 0:1185 0:0065
The table reports the quantiles for the estimated slopes (￿), intercepts (￿) and
price (bid rate) elasticities (") obtained from the disaggregated (d; single bidder)
models. The linear model is denoted by L; while the log-log model by LL. Note
that the slope parameter in the log-log model measures the price (bid rate)
elasticity. The table also reports the quantiles for the estimated bid-shading
components and for the p-values of the one-sided test for statistical sign￿cance
of the estimated bid-shading components. Figures have been multiplied by 100.


























The table reports the estimated parameters for the ausiliary test regressions.
Heteroschedastic standard errors are reported in brackets. ￿ denotes signi￿cance
at the 5% level, ￿￿ denotes sign￿cance at the 1% level. Pdk denotes the results
obtained by the disaggregated parametric approach with kernel estimation,
using the conditional standard deviation of the one-week Eonia rate as proxy for
value uncertainty; Pdk2 denotes the results obtained by the disaggregated
parametric approach with kernel estimation, using the standard deviation of the
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Marginal valuation Bid schedule Q = 300 Bid schedule Q = 400
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Figure 3. Decrease in bid shading






































Figure 4: Empirical distributions and QQ-plots. Estimated log intercepts, log
absolute slopes, log absolute elasticities, and log bid shading components.
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